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Demarcating the social sciences from the natural sciences forms the 
primary concern of much of the literature in the philosophy of 
social science.  These demarcation criteria often take the form of 
distinguishing the objects of social scientific investigation from the 
objects of natural scientific investigation.  While this project has 
produced a great deal of compelling and worthwhile philosophical 
discussion, I think it is most helpful to take social scientific practice 
on its own terms before we compare these systems to natural 
scientific theorizing.  Specifically, I think a more useful picture of 
the social sciences emerges when we attend to the ways social 
scientists engage in classification and conceptualization, and the 
ways classifications interact with their objects of classification. 
Despite his focus on developing an adequate demarcation 
criterion of the type I have declared to be premature, I think the 
philosopher of science Ian Hacking has performed much of the 
legwork needed in developing an adequate account of the types of 
classification in which the social scientist trades.  He attempts to 
articulate an account whereby social scientific classifications 
interact with their objects in a special way.  In the first section, I 
will explicate Hacking’s notions of interactive and indifferent kinds, 
the terms he uses to distinguish the social from the natural 
sciences.  I will also raise a number of worries about the ambiguities 
of these terms and the scope of their explanatory power.  In the 
second section, I will use examples involving classifications of 
sexuality to illustrate two forms of interaction critical to social 
scientific practice that Hacking overlooks.  I will conclude by 
examining an objection to the very idea of distinguishing between 
social scientific classifications and their classificatory objects, using 
this objection to illustrate when such a distinction is appropriate 
and why the distinction is important to social scientific practice.
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Interactive and Indifferent Kinds
Traditional demarcation criteria in the philosophy of social science 
focus on distinguishing social scientific objects of classification 
from natural scientific objects of classification.  Hacking claims to 
bypass these traditional debates by distinguishing social scientific 
ways of classifying from natural scientific ways of classifying. The 
move appears rather subtle, but it is striking in its implications.  
Hacking’s focus is on laying out a method for the social sciences 
distinct from that of the natural sciences.  Other philosophers of 
social science, notably Peter Winch,i have couched their project in 
this sort of methodological language, but their work pays greater 
attention to setting demarcation criteria in terms of the objects of 
social scientific classification.
Hacking’s claim is that social scientific classificatory work is 
interactive, while natural scientific classificatory work is indifferent.   
When the natural scientist articulates a new category or 
classification, she does not change anything about the object or 
objects under study.  Natural scientific classifications are inert and 
independent from their objects.  The act of classifying an object of 
study in physics does not change anything about that object, and 
the object, once classified, does not lead to changes in the 
classification, except for the uncontroversial sense in which those 
classifications are about these objects.  
To make this more concrete, consider Hacking’s discussion of 
the quark (1999, pp. 68-72).  Though the physicist has some degree 
of choice in the object or objects she studies, she changes nothing 
about the object of classification (the quark) in the process of 
classifying it.  Once classified, quarks do not change anything about 
the classification.  Hacking uses Andrew Pickering’s discussion of 
quarksii as a useful way to emphasize these points.  Pickering is a 
‘social constructionist’ about quarks, but even this sort of view is 
compatible with the view that the object of scientific investigation is 
real and does not interact with a natural scientific way of 
classifying.  Pickering’s constructionist thesis amounts to the claim 
that the scientific process leading to the elaboration of a ‘quarky 
physics’ was a contingent process.  Physicists could have proceeded 
in different ways and posited explanatory entities other than 
quarks.  This is perfectly compatible with the view that once we 
have a quarky physics, the quark as object and the quark as 
classificatory term do not interact.  
By contrast, social scientific ways of classifying interact with 
their objects in a two-way process that Hacking terms the ‘looping 
effects’ of human kinds.  The classifications of the social sciences 
are available to be known and understood by their human objects of 
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classification.  The human objects of classification can then come to 
change or modify their behavior based on their understanding of 
the classification in question.  These changes can then come to 
affect the way we understand the original classification.  Consider 
the patient classified as having ‘multiple personality disorder’.  She 
often comes to exhibit the behavior and traits of those people who 
suffer from multiple personality disorder.  She does this in a way 
that reaffirms or reinforces the medical understanding of the 
disorder in question.iii  
Hacking’s examples tend to emphasize the ways in which 
human beings self-ascribe a classificatory term and come to 
conform to its associated norms and practices.  But there are other 
ways these interactions might proceed.  Consider the example of 
the social scientific classification ‘American’.  A political scientist 
might employ this classification when discussing contrasts between 
different strains of political thought, such as American 
individualism and Scandinavian socialism, or when generalizing 
about the mores of American society.  This classificatory term 
comes bundled with certain norms and expectations about the 
objects collected under its scope.  Individual Americans can come 
to learn about the ways experts classify Americans.  They can react 
to this information in a variety of ways in addition to self-ascription 
and conformity.  Perhaps an American reads an article about 
American individualism and reacts negatively to the piece, 
expressing the desire to develop more communitarian values.  She 
responds to her new information by consciously cultivating these 
values.  In cases like this, the objects of classification use the 
classificatory term to change their own practices, and in turn the 
very nature of the classification originally under consideration.  
They do so by perceiving the way they are classified and reacting 
negatively to this classification.    
This sort of process can be described using Hacking’s 
terminology of looping effects.  In cases like the one above, experts 
or other professionals are influenced by the practices of Americans 
to classify them in certain ways.  This is an interaction flowing from 
the objects of classification to the scientist performing classificatory  
work.  The Americans in question then become aware of the ways in 
which they are classified and respond by adjusting their behavior.  
This is an example of interaction flowing in the direction from 
classification to object.  These practices, in turn, will affect the ways 
in which Americans will be classified in the future, another example 
of interaction flowing from object to classification.  
Hacking’s demarcation criterion relies heavily upon our ability 
to fruitfully distinguish between a classification and the objects of a 
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classification.  Why assume that an ‘American’ is anything above 
and beyond those people classified as Americans?  I will consider 
an objection to this very distinction in section three.  A more 
immediate problem with Hacking’s view lies in the way he 
distinguishes interactive from indifferent kinds.  Hacking defined 
interactive and indifferent kinds in terms of scientific 
classifications.  An interactive kind is a social scientific 
classification that interacts with its human objects of classification 
through looping effects.  Hacking explicitly denies that he wants to 
apply the term ‘interactive kinds’ to the human objects of social 
scientific classification (1999, pp. 103-104).  It applies to the way of 
classifying, not the object of classification.  However, Hacking 
explicitly makes this forbidden move when responding to standard 
objections to his demarcation criterion.iv
One popular counter-example to Hacking’s demarcation comes 
from the classification of disease-causing bacteria.  This is a case 
where the classification of the natural scientist, namely the 
classification of ‘disease-causing bacteria’, leads to a series of 
interactions that comes to affect the object of natural scientific 
inquiry.  The classification of the natural scientist inspires the 
medical scientist to treat the newly classified object as problematic.  
In response, she develops and produces antibiotics.  The use of 
these antibiotics causes distinct selection pressures on the original 
bacteria.  These selection pressures lead to evolutionary changes in 
the objects of classification and even to the development of new 
classifications, namely antibiotic-resistant bacteria.  This, of course, 
is quite a common problem in the medical sciences. 
Hacking’s standard response to this type of case is to point to 
the fact that the object of classification in these cases is not aware of 
the ways in which it is classified.  Bacteria are not aware of the work 
of natural scientists.  They do not hold meeting to discuss what 
must be done about the grave threat of antibiotics.  They do not 
think of themselves as disease-causing and do not consciously 
modify their practices as a result of such classifications.  They 
neither seek to conform to their disease-causing ways nor to avoid 
disease-causing due to shame or fear.  In short, they are not aware 
of how they are classified and cannot think through its implications.  
The social sciences, on the other hand, study objects that are aware 
in this way.  They study objects that are interactive.  Hacking 
writes:
Do not microbes adapt themselves to us, quickly evolving strains 
that resist our antibacterial medications?  Is there not a looping 
effect between the microbe and our knowledge?  My simple-
minded reply is that microbes do not do all these things because, 
either individually or collectively, they are aware of what we are 
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doing to them.  The classification microbe is indifferent, not 
interactive, although we are certainly not indifferent to microbes, 
and they do interact with us.  But not because they know what 
they are doing (1999, pp. 106, emphasis Hacking’s).
Hacking acknowledges that there is a kind of interaction between 
microbe as object of study and microbe as it is classified.  He 
dismisses this interaction because it concerns an object that is not 
aware of its classification.
The trouble with this response is that all of these facts about the 
bacteria are irrelevant to Hacking’s claimed demarcation criterion.  
Hacking’s demarcation criterion was supposed to be about ways of 
classifying objects, not about the nature of the objects under 
consideration.  Hacking cannot respond to objections by pointing 
out the interactive nature of objects.  Once Hacking has admitted 
that natural scientific classifications are interactive, his 
demarcation criterion falls apart.  His position collapses into the 
fairly commonplace view that the social sciences deal with self-
aware objects operating in the space of reasons while the natural 
sciences deal with inert objects operating in the space of causes.v  
The counter-example shows that at least some of the classifications 
of the natural sciences, particularly some of those in evolutionary 
biology, are also interactive.vi  
 This, of course, does not invalidate Hacking’s view.  He might 
use his claims about the objects of social scientific classification to 
create a novel thesis about social scientific ways of classifying.  He 
might claim that the social scientist develops interactive 
classifications where the relevant interactions are with interactive 
objects.  The natural scientist might trade in interactive 
classifications, but these classifications interact with inert, 
indifferent objects in law-like causal interactions.  But Hacking 
runs into trouble here with his own example of autism.  Hacking 
wants to hold autism as an example of a social scientific interactive 
kind at work (Hacking 1999, pp. 114-122).  In order to do so, 
Hacking must claim that the classification ‘autism’ interacts with 
the people classified as autistic.  Furthermore, in line with his 
response to cases such as that of disease-causing bacteria, he must 
claim that they interact in a specific sort of way.  People classified as 
autistic must become aware of the way they are classified, and they 
must modify their practices as a result of becoming aware of this 
classification.     
The problem with such a claim is that the relevant medical 
literature does not support the view that people classified as autistic 
can become aware of the way they are classified and react to this 
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classification.  Indeed, some autistic patients are not conceptually 
aware of their surroundings at all, let alone in the sort of way 
required to understand the way they are classified by medical 
experts.vii  If autism is an interactive kind, it interacts with autistic 
patients in ways that are more subtle and are connected to broader 
social, political, and material forces.  Perhaps those who care for 
autistics, such as medical professionals or family and friends, react 
to the classification of autism by treating autistic persons in 
different ways, and this leads to demonstrable changes in the 
practices of autistics.  Autistics might conform to the expectations 
set for them by their caretakers, or they might chafe under 
medically-inspired ill-treatment.
So much for the demarcation criterion.  But even if we cannot 
claim that all social scientific classifications are interactive and all 
natural scientific classifications are indifferent, can we hold on to 
the first half of the conjunct?  Would doing so show important 
results, or reveal something important about the social sciences?  
I’d like to answer ‘yes’ to both of these questions.  This broader 
notion of interaction is one I take to be important, and one to which 
we will move in the next section.  The classifications of the social 
sciences are interactive, but not merely interactive with a human 
object aware of how she is classified.  These classifications interact 
with individual human beings as well as other objects of 
classification and social scientific classifications themselves.  I will 
use examples involving the classification of human sexuality to 
demonstrate this latter point.
 Three Forms of Interaction in the Social Sciences
We saw in the previous section that the sense in which the social 
scientist deals with interactive ways of classifying is broader than 
that identified by Hacking.  Social scientific classifications can enter 
into looping effects with agents aware of the way they are classified, 
but they can also interact with agents in different ways, as with the 
example of autism.  In this section, we will look specifically at two 
types of interactions overlooked by Hacking.  The first type consists 
in the interactions between a classification and the public or 
cultural practices that are picked out or proscribed by the 
classification.  These interactions are sometimes mediated by the 
self-aware agent Hacking favors, but they often involve individuals 
who unreflectively conform to expected ways of behaving.  The 
second type consists in classifications that interact with other 
classifications.  There are, I will argue, three types of interactions 
critical to social scientific practice:
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1. There are interactions between social scientific 
classifications and human objects of classification who 
explicitly articulate these ways of classifying.  This is 
Hacking’s paradigm case, and these interactions take the 
form of the looping effects Hacking describes.
2. There are interactions between social scientific 
classifications and broader habits or cultural practices.  
Social scientific classifications can affect public norms 
and expectations of what human beings are supposed to 
do.  These interactions are most commonly between a 
classification and human beings who unreflectively 
conform or react to social norms.
3. There are interactions between social scientific 
classifications and other social scientific classifications.  
One classification can create a natural conceptual space 
for the articulation of other concepts.  These interactions 
can take the form of either involved, theoretical 
reflection or they can be embodied or realized through 
the unreflective conformity of individuals.
I will use examples involving the classification of human sexuality 
to illustrate these additional forms of interaction.  These three 
forms of interaction will help us build a more complete picture of 
what the social scientist does.  I will argue in the next section that a 
focus on one or another of these forms of interaction, to the 
exclusion of the other(s), often leads philosophers of social science 
astray in giving an account of the social sciences and demarcating 
them from the natural sciences.
Classification of human sexual inclination or ‘orientation’ was 
spurred largely by the study of homosexuality.  But what’s a 
homosexual?  Before the nineteenth century, not much at all, 
though many of the human practices taken as objects under the 
classification ‘homosexual’ were already present.  Women had 
sexual relationships with women, and men had sexual relationships 
with men.  Some of these relationships were long-term and sexually  
monogamous.  At times, the existence of these relationships was 
well-known.  Some societies practiced tolerance, while other 
expressed disapproval or the worst forms of persecution.  Thanks to 
the work of people such as Foucault, these things are commonly 
known.
The classification ‘homosexual’ can be straightforwardly 
interactive in Hacking’s sense.  ‘Homosexual’ is interactive because 
we can think of ourselves in terms of this classification and modify 
our practices.  Suppose Luke is in a relationship with Linda, but 
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occasionally has sexual encounters with James.  Aware of the 
existence of the classification ‘homosexual’, Luke may seek to hide 
his behavior out of fear of being classified as homosexual.viii  
Alternatively, perhaps these concerns lead him to end his 
encounters with James, because Luke comes to identify himself as 
‘heterosexual’.  If these encounters are quite frequent, we may even 
accuse Luke of denying his own history in a case of Sartrean bad 
faith.  This is a case of (1), where Luke has explicitly articulated the 
classification homosexual and uses it to modify his own practices.  
If cases 
like Luke’s are prevalent, it might lead a social scientist to consider 
ways to expand or contract the classification in order to account for 
cases such as these.  The social scientist might use reactions such as 
Luke’s to recalibrate the classificatory term, to modify what counts 
as homosexual or heterosexual practice.  
The classification ‘homosexuality’ is interactive in the senses of 
(2) and (3), because it can interact with broader social forces or 
other social scientific classifications.  Through associating certain 
cultural practices with ‘homosexuality’, we have come to affect 
other social scientific classifications, such as tolerance and 
intolerance, gay pride, and the “religious right”.  The modern 
articulation of homosexuality and its ascent from a cultural taboo to 
a widely accepted practice have led advocates of tolerance and 
opponents of discrimination to include sexuality as a protected 
class, along with race, social class, or national origin.  The 
articulation of homosexuality has also led to the formation of 
specifically homosexual institutions, such as the gay bar and the gay  
pride rally.  These interactions are cases of (2).  A classification has 
come to affect broader cultural practices.    
One important point to note about interactions of type (2) is 
that they need not be mediated by the reflective agent who 
articulates a concept and comes to apply it to her own life.  Of 
course, this sometimes occurs.  The gay bar is a useful example here 
because it exemplifies both of these cases.  In one particular place, 
namely the Greenwich Village neighborhood of Manhattan, the gay 
bar was a product of people of similar sexual orientation coming 
together in the same place as a result of increasing social openness 
about homosexuality in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  This did not involve 
the explicit articulation of a new set of cultural practices or norms.  
Rather, the way a certain classification was taken by people in a 
certain material and social location created a space for the 
development of new practices.  The process of legalization of gay 
bars, however, did involve theoretical articulation.   Specifically, 
once ‘gay bar’ was established as a term of public interest, 
Matt L. Drabek 69 Poroi 6, 2, January 2010
authorities in Manhattan began using police raids to shut down 
such establishments.  This led to widespread fear and the 
understandable dissolution of a number of gay bars, until the 
president of a local gay rights organization successfully challenged 
the law.  He quite literally set out to theoretically articulate his 
situation toward meeting the goal of changing public practices.  
This latter case is a case of type (2) where the public practices in 
question come to interact with a classification via explicit 
articulation. ix  
The original classification of homosexuality led to an explosion 
of classifications of human sexuality.  As an immediate point of 
contrast, it led to the conceptualization of heterosexuality, 
previously taken as a kind of assumed norm of behavior.  
Dissatisfaction with this dichotomy led to the classification of 
‘bisexuality’, while dissatisfaction with this trichotomy led 
sexologists to elaborate the seven-point Kinsey Scale and a variety 
of alternatives.  These are examples of (3).  The point is that a new 
social scientific classification may interact with other classifications 
in a variety of ways.  The articulation of one classification may make 
evident the existence of a conceptual space for other classifications, 
and provide a space for new classificatory work.  
Interaction (3), too, can be either a product of articulated, 
theoretical work or it can take place through embodied agents 
acting unreflectively.  The examples in the last paragraph are of the 
former type.  In the former type of case, the conceptual space for a 
new classification can be divorced from the actual practices of 
people in favor of the needs of social scientific theorizing.  But 
consider the following sort of case.  The term ‘marginal value’ is one 
used by the economist.  Marginal value denotes a value that is true 
given a particular set of constraints or assumptions, as well as the 
change in a value associated with changes in particular values or 
variables.  Marginal value can interact with other classifications of 
the economist, such as consumer or purchasing behavior.  If a 
laborer increased her income from $20,000 per year to $28,000, 
the marginal value of her new income would be $8,000.  Suppose 
that as a result of this marginal value, she increases her bread 
purchases from fifty loaves per year to sixty loaves.  This is a case 
where one classification, the marginal value of the laborer’s income, 
is said by the social scientist to interact with another classification, 
her consumer behavior.  Of course, ordinary folks do not articulate 
and theorize about marginal value.  Their actions embody the 
classifications.
These interactions move beyond the types of cases emphasized 
by Hacking.  The homosexual can become aware of the way she is 
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classified and come to conform to or reject her classification, but 
the classification can also come to shape cultural practice in 
unarticulated ways.  Our concept of homosexuality comes bundled 
with expected ways of behaving.  We are socialized into these ways 
of behaving when we learn about the classification.  One need not 
be an agent aware of the way she is classified in order to be 
influenced by these expectations.   
Classification, Objects of Classification, and Social 
Scientific Practice
Much of the traditional debate in the philosophy of social science 
involves clarifying the objects of social scientific inquiry.  Deciding 
the objects with which social scientists deal is no small problem for 
the philosophy of social science and has formed a large sticking 
point of debate.  Generally speaking, I think we can discern two 
currents or broad schools of thought in this debate.x  One group 
argues that the social sciences study objective social structures or a 
distinct realm of social knowledge, the ‘social fact’.  From the 
traditional sociology of Durkheim to the structuralist or holist 
tradition, this route involves positing an ontological realm that is 
distinctly social and is studied by distinct empirical methods.  
Another group argues that the social world is constructed from the 
natural world and/or social meaning.  A diverse lot, this group 
includes those from the reasons-based explanation of Winch to the 
social reality of Searlexi to the “constructionist” tag often attributed 
to figures in the humanities.xii 
Hacking’s work on demarcating the natural and social sciences 
involves an attempt to bypass this sort of dichotomy.  But when 
attempting to overturn an entrenched debate between two plausible 
positions, it is important to capture the intuitions of both positions.  
Hacking does not do this.  He appropriately captures the 
constructionist intuition that many of the features of the social 
world are contingent and susceptible to changes in beliefs and 
attitudes, but he does not capture the intuitions of the traditional 
sociologist or the structuralist.  I suspect this is why Hacking is 
occasionally mistaken for a card-carrying social constructionist.xiii  
Social structures are important.  Sometimes, they impact our lives 
in ways in which we are either unaware or only dimly aware.  A 
successful account of the social sciences must make sense of this.  
Such a task is not easy.  It will involve a close study of the 
relations between social scientific classifications and human 
practices that cannot merely rely on the actions of self-aware moral 
agents.  Many of these relations appear hidden and are difficult to 
predict and study.  More radical critics, such as Turner (2002) 
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point to the multiple realizability of a human practice or behavior in 
a variety of different rules or social structures in support of the view 
that much of the work of the social scientist is either misleading or 
consists in the use of unsupported ontological baggage.
Through studying the three types of interaction listed in the 
previous section, I have identified a way in which such a study 
might proceed.  We can take many of the traditionally problematic 
objects of social scientific inquiry, such as ‘social facts’ and ‘social 
forces’, and conceive of them as social scientific classifications, 
rather than social scientific objects.  This allows us to ask whether 
or not they enter into the types of interactions studied by the social 
sciences.  While it is a mystery how a social force could exert causal 
influence when thought of as an object, thinking of it as a 
classification makes this less mysterious.  A classification is 
proposed by the social scientist through explicit articulation and 
theoretical reflection.  It can then interact with human objects of 
inquiry through the three forms of interaction.
The trouble with this view is that it depends heavily on 
maintaining the distinction between social scientific classifications 
and the objects of social scientific classification, a distinction that 
some have denied.  Rouse (2002), for example, claims that a social 
scientific classification is nothing above and beyond its embedding 
into a broader social, natural, and material situation.  He thinks a 
fully articulated situation would provide all of the explanatory 
power offered by a social scientific classification.  This is 
threatening to my approach because my approach depends on 
holding out a set of classifications that are the product of theoretical 
articulation and explication, and this process often involves a 
separation of classification from object.  It is also threatening to 
Hacking’s notion of looping effects.  If Rouse is correct, what 
Hacking calls looping effects are nothing above and beyond 
interactions in the ordinary material and social world.  The sort of 
interaction taken by Hacking as unique to the explanatory model of 
the social scientist is simply another thing the human individual 
does in the process of navigating in the everyday world of things, 
objects, and other people.  There is no reason to believe that such 
interactions constitute some sort of special explanatory problem 
requiring a distinct science or method.
I think Rouse makes a worthwhile point, but its applicability is 
constrained in certain ways.  Rouse, like Hacking, focuses on 
certain types of interactions at the expense of the others.  With 
regard to interaction type (2), Rouse is surely correct to point to the 
inability to distinguish classifications and the classified objects in 
many cases.  With homosexuality, we are affected by a classification 
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we do not always take as a theoretical object.  Furthermore, our 
actions, preferences, and attitudes affect the very category of 
homosexuality.  As a generational shift occurs in attitudes of 
tolerance toward homosexuals and expectations about how 
homosexual relationships are supposed to proceed, the very 
category of homosexuality will change in a number of ways.  As we 
change our practices, we will change the classification in a variety of 
explicit and implicit ways, such as establishing new expectations for 
how such relationships should function.  
While Rouse is successful in explaining some cases, his elision is 
not fruitful in other cases.  One type of case is instrumental.  When 
the social scientist introduces a new theory or piece of terminology, 
she must separate her classification from its objects in order to test 
the fidelity and explanatory scope of the new term.  If a political 
scientist studying contemporary Colombia generalizes the 
Colombian political system as a ‘Caudillo democracy’, she would 
need to abstract from these practices in order to test the generality 
of the term and its possible application to other political systems.  
Moving to neighboring Venezuela might provide her with a useful 
case study.  In Colombia, a strong leader rose to power with 
widespread popular support in a way that subverted the traditional 
political establishment.  The Colombian armed forces are 
supplemented largely by a country with a troubled record of 
international relations, namely the United States.  Similar 
conditions apply in Venezuela, with the exceptions that the 
Venezuelan leader is a figure of the left rather than the right, and 
the questionable international support comes from Russia and Iran, 
rather than the United States.  
However, there are differences.  The Colombian government is 
engaged in a vicious armed conflict with elements of its own 
population, while Venezuela is not.  The Venezuelan government 
has fostered popular participation and local democracy in the form 
of community organizational councils, while Colombia has not.  
Venezuela is notoriously inept and weak in dealing with crime, 
while Colombia is notoriously corrupt and draconian.  Venezuela’s 
president is exuberant, confrontational, and occasionally 
obnoxious, while Colombia’s is famously bashful.  The political 
scientist must abstract the classification ‘caudillo democracy’ from 
its objects because she must decide whether or not to apply the 
term elsewhere, and how to do so.  She must also decide which of 
these differences between Colombia and Venezuela are relevant.  
Does the fostering of spaces for public participation absolve Chavez 
of his alleged caudillo status?  Does his shy demeanor absolve 
Uribe?
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Another type of case where the distinction may prove fruitful is 
when new classifications are introduced in a way that depends on 
the previous classificatory field.  Hacking, for example, claims that 
a classification often needs a social niche in which to appear and 
thrive (Hacking 1998).  He uses the example of dissociative fugue, a  
commonly diagnosed illness in nineteenth century France in which 
the patient aimlessly wanders away from home unannounced and 
unexpected.  Diagnoses of this particular illness were almost 
completely isolated to this particular historical and cultural context, 
never becoming popular outside of France and (briefly) Germany.  
One requirement for such a phenomenon to occur, according to 
Hacking, is that there must be a natural conceptual space in the 
current medical taxonomy.  Such a space existed for dissociative 
fugue between the previously conceptualized illnesses of epilepsy 
and hysteria.  Without articulated theories of epilepsy and hysteria, 
articulations of fugue could not have occurred.  The closing of this 
space in the early twentieth century, due to changes in medical 
taxonomy, led to the closing of this conceptual space and the 
disappearance of diagnoses of dissociative fugue.xiv  What is critical 
here is that the conceptual space opened for fugue originated in 
scientific theorizing about the classificatory field, in addition to 
theorizing directly about the practices of the suffering patients.  
Such cases are not isolated to psychiatry.  Indeed, they look like 
particular instances of interaction (3).  Consider our earlier 
example of the conceptual explosion that occurred in the wake of 
the conceptualization of homosexuality.  The classification of 
certain practices as homosexual practices created several natural 
points of taxonomic distinction, allowing for the conceptualization 
of heterosexuality and bisexuality (and eventually, due to 
dissatisfaction with these models, a variety of ‘sexuality spectrum’ 
approaches).  As with the case of fugue, the relevant scientific 
theorizing did not occur through linking particular practices to a 
classification, but rather mining current classificatory schemes for 
an open conceptual space for new theorizing.  Like fugue, social 
scientific conceptualizations of heterosexuality, homosexuality, and 
bisexuality would become largely obsolete if the conceptual spaces 
were closed.  If one or another approach that considers sexuality to 
be a spectrum were to become dominant and widely disseminated 
throughout the scientific and lay communities, these classifications 
may disappear. 
It may also be necessary to distinguish between classifications 
and objects in the service of social critique and change.  The 
libertarian socialist tradition of thought, for example, has often held 
that revolutionary social change requires both mass action on the 
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part of individuals and the organization of individuals into free 
associations that theorize about proper revolutionary change.  The 
Spanish FAI of 1927-1939 was one such organization, and the 
Venezuelan communal council may represent a modern form.  The 
point of such organizations is to develop a larger thematization or 
narrative by which individuals might coordinate their actions.  The 
development of such a narrative requires participants to abstract a 
category from mass action so that they may develop a structure of 
norms and goals around which they might build future action.
Of course, these types of cases might be considered by Rouse to 
be merely instrumental distinctions between classifications and 
objects.  Once the classification becomes settled, it is tied to specific 
individual and cultural practices and institutions.  When the 
political scientist fixes her conception or theory of caudillo 
democracy, this classification consists in certain types of cultural 
practices, such as the subservience of the lawmaking and law-
enforcing process to the caudillo.  She may think of the deliberation 
process as the systematic attempt to fit together concept and object.  
Once this fit is achieved, one need not bother distinguishing the 
two, except for explanatory convenience.  When the libertarian 
socialist clarifies her goals, her actions are the revolution.  When 
Hacking describes the looping effects of human kinds, he reserves a  
special role for the agent who deliberates about a classification, who 
takes a classification as a theoretical object.  Rouse’s elision of the 
classification/object distinction takes away this role.  When he says 
that a person thinks about the way she is classified and changes her 
behavior to conform to this classification, Hacking is describing a 
cognitive process.  Rouse would translate this process into pre-
cognitive or non-cognitive language.  When the Colombian thinks 
about caudillo democracy and when the man who has sex with men 
thinks about the classification homosexual, they are thinking about 
behaviors and practices in which individuals and groups engage.  
Conformity, or failure to conform, to the category is a matter of 
whether or not we conform to the norms already present in such 
practices.  The addition of a category or classification to the picture 
does not have any explanatory weight or value on its own.
The distinction between different types of interactions sheds 
light on this particular debate in a way that can help us make sense 
of the distinction between concept and object that Hacking holds to 
be critical and Rouse globally denies.  Interactions (2) and (3) 
occasionally conform quite well to Rouse’s analysis.  The trouble 
with Rouse’s account is that it is impoverished when trying to 
explain Hacking’s original, paradigmatic cases of interaction.  
While I have shown that many interactions are a matter of 
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unreflective conformity to the behavior of those around us, some 
interactions really are a matter of theoretical reflection and 
adjusting of our practices.  We can return again to the example of 
Luke and Linda introduced in section two.  In ending his 
encounters with James, Luke was not merely interacting with the 
practices of those around him.  His interaction was a theoretical 
reflection on a category, a way of classifying and organizing public 
practices.  Without the category, his actions could not be 
appropriately explained.  His fear was one of being associated with 
a category, not with the objects classified by the category.
Hubert Dreyfus draws a distinction that is quite helpful in 
understanding the differences between these types of interactions.  
Dreyfus distinguishes between something he calls transparent or 
practical coping on the one hand and explicit or deliberate coping 
on the other.  When a person engages in transparent or practical 
coping, she navigates her situation and environment in an 
unreflective and unproblematic way.  She does not need to 
explicitly articulate her environment and does not need to engage 
in theoretical reflection, because she is already familiar with it.  The 
person engaged in explicit or deliberate coping does need to 
explicitly articulate her environment, and may need to engage in 
theoretical reflection.xv  
The interactions studied by social scientists are often best 
described by one of these types of coping, and the type of coping to 
which it belongs is critical to the success or failure of Rouse’s 
objection to Hacking.  In the types of interactions I emphasize, 
namely (2) and (3), individual agents are most often engaged in 
practical coping.  They seamlessly move through their environment,  
conforming to the norms and practices of others.  In these cases, 
Rouse seems quite right to deny the distinction between social 
scientific classifications and their objects.  Classifications are 
merely convenient terms used to denote the ways people engage in 
practical coping with their environment.
The problematic cases for Rouse begin when we move from 
practical coping to explicit or deliberate coping.xvi  In the types of 
interaction emphasized by Hacking, agents have problematized and 
theoretically articulated their own practices.  They reflect upon and 
change these practices in a way that gives added significance to the 
classification.  If we do not distinguish between classifications and 
their objects in these sorts of cases, we fail to explain the behavior 
of these agents engaged in deliberate coping.  It is this agent that 
provides many of the cases important to social scientific reflection 
and theorizing.  These agents, as Hacking suggests, are ‘moving 
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targets’.  Forming predictive laws and hypotheses in these cases of 
interaction may prove especially difficult.
Conclusion
As we saw earlier, the chief novelty behind interactive kinds is that 
they are about social scientific classifications, rather than the 
objects of these classifications.  While we saw that Hacking is wrong 
to use the interactive natural or social scientific classifications to 
demarcate the social sciences from the natural sciences, Hacking 
effectively points to the importance that interactive classifications 
have for social scientific practice.  I have shown that Hacking’s 
notion of interaction is only one type among several types of 
interaction that are important to the social scientist.  I have also 
shown how these various forms of interaction are manifested in the 
social sciences, specifically to the roles they play in the development 
and continued uses of social scientific classifications. 
A certain type of interaction, namely that which results when an 
individual or group of individuals forms a thematization or 
narrative about their practices, forms a distinct sort of interaction 
critical to social scientific practice.  The philosopher seeking to 
demarcate the social sciences from the natural sciences must 
account for each of these three types of interaction, and it is not 
obvious that the account will treat each of them in the same way.  
Further work must be done toward articulating the nature and 
mechanisms of these three interactions.  Are they causal, reasons-
based, or something else entirely?  Cases of unreflective conformity 
or rejection of public norms appear to require different treatment 
from that accorded to cases of theoretical articulation of 
classifications or concepts. 
© Matt L. Drabek, 2010.
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ii See Winch (1990 [1958]).
ii See Pickering (1984).
iii Hacking gives thorough treatment to this topic in Hacking (1995).
iv Tsou also points out Hacking’s classification/object conflation (2007, esp. pp. 
335).
v Martinez (2009) also points out that Hacking’s view does not really constitute a 
novelty in demarcating the social sciences from the natural sciences.  
vi Bruno Latour (1988) elaborates an alternative way to respond to these sorts of 
cases.  Latour uses them as evidence for the importance of a kind of material 
agency that he attributes to all objects of scientific classification, human and non-
human alike.
vii See Martinez (2009, pp. 229-231) for an extended discussion of the autism 
literature and the ways in which Hacking’s case of autism looks quite similar to 
the case of disease-causing bacteria in its forms of interaction.
viii Of course, this is not the usual way of reading such a case.  We would normally  
suspect that Luke is either a closeted homosexual, or that he is worried about the 
social repercussions for his behavior.  But it is perfectly plausible that it is the 
classification he is worried about.  Perhaps he lives in a community that takes a 
single instance of homosexual behavior to be evidence of homosexuality, and that 
associates such a classification with other negative beliefs about the person.  
ix The gay rights leader was Dick Leitsch, who was President of the Mattachine 
Society of Manhattan.  See Simon (2008) for the transcript of an interview with 
Leitsch where he recalls the event under discussion.
x I am relying primarily upon Schatzki (2003) and Fay/Moon (1994) in 
elaborating this distinction.  Each text presents the distinction in a slightly 
different manner, with Schatzki focusing on the distinction between individualist 
and non-individualist ontologies, while Fay/Moon focus on the distinction 
between naturalist and humanist views of the social sciences.  Both sets of 
distinctions are about the same thing, namely the objects of social scientific 
classification.
xi See Searle (1995).
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xii It would be impossible to review the entire history here, but a couple of 
examples might suffice.  Durkheim and other traditional sociologists posit that 
the objects of social scientific classification and investigation form a distinct layer 
of knowledge, that of the ‘social fact’.  Facts in the social realm, such as ‘nations’, 
‘tribes’, or ‘corporations’, were held to be special sorts of theoretical objects with 
independent causal powers over other objects of the social sciences, such as 
individual and group actions.  These social facts are not reducible to facts about 
individuals and/or their relations.  This quite naturally leads to the explanatory 
problem of explicating what types of objects these are, how they relate to the 
human beings who may or may not embody them or act in their name, and just 
how the causal relations amongst them are supposed to work.  Constructionists, 
in contrast to the traditional sociologist, avoid ingrained social objects and causal  
explanations in favor of non-naturalist accounts of meaning and contingently 
constructed objects of social scientific inquiry.  Peter Winch, for example, takes 
the task of the social scientist to be the investigation of our understanding of the 
social world.  This involves the investigation of human meaning through 
language, which is located in the community of which one is a member.  Human 
beings interact with one another socially not through causal interaction with 
social forces, but rather through interpreting or giving reasons for their actions in  
terms of the normative standards of their community.  Winch is not a typical 
example of ‘social constructionism,’ but he shares its key features.  The objects of 
social scientific investigation on Winch’s account are highly contingent and can 
vary widely across different communities.  Explaining society involves 
interpreting action against a background of shared contingent meanings rather 
than offering causal explanations.  See Zammito (2004) for a more thorough 
treatment of the constructionist side of this debate.
xiii Turner (2002) labels Hacking a social constructionist.
xiv Murphy (2001, pp. 145-146) also discusses this particular case from Hacking.
xv Dreyfus also distinguishes between deliberate coping and theoretical 
reflection, but this distinction is not critical to the current point.
xvi Rouse (2000) addresses some of these worries by denying the distinction 
between practical coping and deliberate or engaged coping.  See also Dreyfus’s 
(2000) response to Rouse.
